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The central point of Brogaard’s interesting essay is that temporalism, 
roughly, the thesis that there are propositions whose evaluation is 
sensitive to time (14), is a better alternative to standard semantic eter-
nalism, roughly, the thesis that no proposition is sensitive to tem-
poral variation. Five theoretical roles individuate propositions: (i) 
semantic values of sentences, (ii) objects of attitudes, (iii) objects of 
agreement and disagreement, (iv) what is transferred in successful 
communication, and (v) what intensional operators operate on (5-6, 
30). For each of those roles Brogaard aims at showing that tempo-
ral propositions fare better than eternal ones, in that the problems 
that have been traditionally raised against them can be overcome, 
while more serious problems can be raised against eternal proposi-
tions. Although most of the book touches upon issues of philosophy 
of language and philosophy of mind, as it should be, there are several 
considerations that Brogaard makes about the relation between the 
semantic tenets of temporalism and eternalism, on the one side, and 
the metaphysics of time, on the other. In this note, I will assume that 
the semantic arguments in the book for preferring temporalism over 
eternalism are sound, and confine myself to some criticism concern-
ing their metaphysical import.
In the introduction, Brogaard points out that semantic eternalism 
is metaphysically more demanding than temporalism, since it entails 
metaphysical eternalism, namely the view that past and future times are 
ontologically on a par with the present — or at least because it rules 
out presentism, the thesis that only present entities exist (6-7). The 
reason is that eternal propositions can contain non-present times as 
constituents. Assuming that the existence of a proposition entails the 
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existence of its constituents, it follows that eternal propositions con-
taining reference to non-present times are incompatible with pre-
sentism. Of course, a presentist could think of times as some sort of 
ersatz entities, namely sets of temporal propositions. But the proposi-
tions that individuate times are temporal propositions, and thus they 
are not at the semantic eternalist’s disposal (see 7, note 4).
I agree with Brogaard’s remarks. Indeed, while there is no im-
mediate objection to the use of ersatz times as parameters of the cir-
cumstances of evaluation that the presentist makes, appealing to a set 
of propositions as a constituent of a proposition seems suspiciously 
circular. However, I do not think that those arguments can be used 
to support temporalism, at least the variety of temporalism defended 
in the book. Here is the problem: semantic eternalism is supposed to 
put stricter constraints on the choice of a metaphysics of time than 
temporalism. However, it is the thesis that some eternal propositions 
exist that is at odds with presentism, rather than the stronger the-
sis that all propositions are eternal. And many temporalists do ad-
mit that not all propositions are temporal. Brogaard herself defends 
a version of temporalism in which eternal propositions that make 
reference to non-present times are accepted (155-57). Maybe I am 
wrong and presentism is compatible after all with propositions that 
make explicit reference to a non-present time. But if I am wrong, be-
cause presentist can resort to ersatz times as constituents of proposi-
tions, say, then it seems that semantic eternalism is compatible with 
presentism after all. I can imagine an ‘in between position’ to the 
effect that the temporalist can accept ersatz times as constituents of 
eternal propositions, while the eternalist cannot. But I do not think 
this view is very appealing, and it is defended nowhere in the book.
Be that as it may, I have another concern with respect to how 
Brogaard characterizes the relation between semantic eternalism 
and metaphysical eternalism. According to her: ‘semantic eternalism 
[...] makes it difficult for metaphysical eternalists to articulate the 
commitment of their theories’ (7). This thesis is first stated in the 
introduction and then elaborated at length in Chapter 7. Here is what 
I take to be the core’s of Brogaard’s position. Presentists and eter-
nalist are taken to disagree on whether wholly past objects, such as 
Socrates, exist. Thus, a way to state their disagreement is to say that 
they disagree on how (2) below [Chapter 7’s numeration] is evaluated 
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when uttered, say, in 2013.
(2) Socrates exists.
However, ordinarily understood, (2) is taken to convey that Socrates 
is located roughly in the same spatiotemporal location in which we 
are, and thus we can meet him as we meet our friends. Both the eter-
nalist and the presentist agree on the falsity of this reading. In the lit-
erature, many agree that in order to avoid a skeptical outcome with 
respect to the substantivity of the eternalism/presentism distinc-
tion, something like such a ‘philosophy room reading’ of (2) must 
be at both the eternalist’s and the presentist’s disposal1. Roughly the 
idea is that what the eternalist means with (2), when she disagrees 
on the truth value of an utterance of (2) in 2013 with the presentist, 
is that quantifying unrestrictedly — in particular, without any restric-
tion on the temporal dimension — (2) expresses a true proposition.
Now, why, according to Brogaard, is the metaphysical eternal-
ist who also endorses semantic eternalism in trouble? The idea is 
that from eternalism it follows that any tensed sentence expresses an 
eternal proposition relative to its context of utterance. Thus, (2) as 
uttered at time t* expresses the proposition that is more perspicu-
ously expressed by (2a) below.
(2a) Socrates exists at t*.
However, (2a) seems to be as ambiguous as (2), and thus it does not 
qualify as a good analysis of the ‘philosophy room’ reading of (2). 
Providing that a minimal condition on a good analysis is to yield an 
unambiguous paraphrase. Brogaard’s proposal is to endorse tempo-
ralism instead, and to allow for two readings of (2) in terms of the 
proposition that they express. According to the first reading — the 
ordinary reading — (2) expresses a temporal proposition that gets 
evaluated at the time of utterance. In this reading, both the presen-
tist and the eternalist agree that (2) is false. According to the second 
1 See Zimmermann 1998, Oaklander 2002, Sider 2006, Tallant 2013 and 
the debate between Crisp 2004a, 2004b and Ludlow 2004. Meyer 2005, Savitt 
2006, Dorato 2006, Callender 2011 hold a sceptical position.
reading — the philosophy room reading — (2) expresses an eternal 
proposition that only the eternalist accepts as true.
I have three qualms here, the first and the last with Brogaard’s 
positive proposal, and the second with her criticism of eternalism’s 
expressive capacity. As for the first qualm, according to Brogaard, 
and coherently with her view, the eternal proposition that Socrates 
exists is evaluable as true or false simpliciter only in a context in which 
either Socrates is an instantaneous object, or Socrates always (or nev-
er) exists (150). But then, if Socrates is not a instantaneous object, 
the presentist cannot claim that (2) is false in the philosophical room 
reading. She can disagree with the eternalist only in the sense that 
she does not accept (2) as true. Maybe that’s enough for making the 
disagreement substantial, but if an alternative accounts in which (2) 
turns out false is available to the presentist, there seem to be reasons 
to prefer it. I understand that Brogaard endorses four-dimensional-
ism as a theory of persistence, and thus she does have an account in 
which the eternal reading of (2) is false simpliciter, since she maintains 
that in that reading (2) is about a instantaneous temporal slice of 
Socrates. However, dialectically, the fact that if one assumes tempo-
ralism, then one must endorse a particular thesis about persistence in 
order to express a distinction about temporal ontology seems to me 
a drawback of temporalism.
Secondly, it is not clear to me why the fact that a sentence such as 
(2a) is ambiguous between a restricted reading and an unrestricted 
reading of the quantifier counts as evidence against semantic eternal-
ism. Brogaard’s worry seems to be that the role of the time of utter-
ance t* in the proposition expressed is unclear. But once we accept 
the distinction between a temporally restricted and a temporally 
unrestricted reading of quantification (and something analogous for 
predication), the worry is spurious. The role of the temporal param-
eter provided by the context within the content expressed depend 
on the particular form of semantic eternalism, but in no case it will 
determine a restriction on the quantifier on an unrestricted reading of 
the quantifier. Of course, if the quantifier is understood as temporally 
restricted, then the time of utterance together with tenses and pos-
sibly other (pragmatic and semantic) elements will determine the 
restriction. But if we agree that the distinction between temporally 
restricted and temporally unrestricted interpretation of the quanti-
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fier is understood, then Brogaard’s complain vanishes.
Generally speaking, the problem of articulating the commitments 
of presentism and eternalism seems to me orthogonal to the debate 
on temporalism vs. eternalism. In order to state the disagreement 
between the presentist and the eternalist, we need to understand (2) 
in such a way that the extension of ‘exist’ is not limited by temporal 
factors2. Once we grasp this unrestricted construal of ‘exist’, if we 
are temporalists, we will take the claim to express a temporally neu-
tral proposition to be evaluated relative to the time of utterance; if 
we are eternalist, we will take it to express a content that is indexed 
to the time of utterance, and thus temporally invariant. Maybe many 
metaphysical eternalists, after having read Brogaard’s semantic argu-
ments in favor of temporalism, will decide to endorse her view (I 
may be one of them), but semantic eternalism as such is not an ob-
stacle to understanding temporally unrestricted quantification.
What would be an obstacle to articulate presentism and eternal-
ism is ruling out by semantics alone the possibility that what exists sim-
pliciter, namely unrestrictedly speaking, changes over time. The core 
of the distinction after all is that according to the eternalism what 
exists simpliciter never changes through time, whereas for the presen-
tist it does. And it is important that such claims be stated by using the 
same language, which would be impossible if the language itself ruled 
out one of the two positions. But semantic eternalism does not rule 
out this possibility, in so far as it allows for tensed sentences to express 
claims of existence simpliciter. This leads me to my last worry.
When the eternalist refers to presently existing things, it seems 
natural to think that the agreement with the presentist is not con-
fined only to the ordinary readings of the claims (on whose truth-
value she agrees with the presentist also in the case of past entities), 
but it also reaches the unrestricted reading. But this does not seem 
to be the case if the unrestricted reading is interpreted as the read-
ing that expresses an eternal proposition that does not contain a 
time constituent, as Brogaard maintains (148). The reason is that 
Brogaard is compelled to maintain that existential eternal proposi-
tions about non eternal entities are never true for the presentist, not 
even when uttered when the entity at issue is present. Therefore, 
2 I have argued that in Torrengo 2012.
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there is a sense in which the presentist and the eternalist necessarily 
disagree on what presently exists, which seems to me a weird outcome 
of the view.
Imagine the following situation. A presentist and an eternalist 
find themselves in a biology lab. A scientist is observing through a 
microscope an amoeba (call it ‘Amoeba’), which is about to undergo 
a process of a mitosis. Suppose that at t, Amoeba has not undergone 
mitosis, while at t’ the process is complete, and assume that individu-
al amoebas do not survive processes of mitosis (choose some other fa-
tal event for protozoa otherwise). Consider now claim (1) below, and 
imagine that the eternalist utters it once at t and a second time at t’.
(1) Amoeba exists.
In the ordinary reading, the presentist and the eternalist agree that 
(1) is true when uttered the first time (at t), and false when uttered 
the second time (at t’). In the philosophy room reading, the two will 
disagree at t’: according to the eternalist, the eternal proposition that 
Amoeba exists is true at t’, whereas the same cannot be said of the 
presentist. But what about an utterance of (1) at t in the unrestricted 
reading? According to Brogaard’s proposal, it should be taken to ex-
press a eternal proposition with no time index, which has the same 
truth vale with respect to t and t’. This is fine for the eternalist, who 
evaluates both utterances of the unrestricted reading as true. But it is 
bad news for the presentist. Since she does not accept (1) as true at t’ 
in the unrestricted reading, she is compelled to do the same with an 
utterance of (1) at t — the eternal proposition expressed in both con-
texts being the same. Can’t we say that the presentist at t agrees with 
the eternalist that Amoeba exists simpliciter? No, because, again, that 
would entail that Amoeba will exist simpliciter at t’ too (160). Notice 
that according to the ‘standard’ semantic eternalist, utterances of 
tensed sentences such as (1) express time indexed eternal proposition. 
Thus, an utterance of the same sentence expresses different (time in-
dexed) eternal propositions on different occasions, even when read 
unrestrictedly. This is good news, because it allows us to express 
the key difference between the presentist, who takes unrestricted 
existential claim to vary over time, and the eternalist, who does not. 
Finally, Brogaard argues convincingly that for the roles that proposi-
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tions usually have in philosophy of language and mind the best op-
tion is often to endorse temporalism. However, when it comes to 
metaphysics, the traditional eternalist approach looks to me on more 
steady ground.
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